11 Genealogies of Extraction

De Facto Development Zones in the Indonesian Borderlands

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Abstract
Taking departure from the failure of a planned but never realised special economic zone (SEZ) in the Indonesian borderland city of Tarakan, we argue that this planned SEZ would paradoxically not have been the island of sovereign exception often associated with SEZs, but rather a zone where central government would have had comparably more control than they have in the surrounding borderlands. This leads us to argue that the entire borderland surrounding Tarakan can be considered a de facto development zone in itself. Additionally, the de facto development zone is multigenerational, having been through a number of booms and busts, triggering both migrations and environmental ruination, while central state authority and interest have waxed and waned accordingly.

Keywords: development zones, ruins, maritime extraction, Indonesia

Introduction

In late 2015, the task force that for the past eight years had been working in the regional development office towards establishing a special economic zone (SEZ, or KEK[1] in Indonesian) in Tarakan, a borderland city in Indonesia, closed down. It was a rather unremarkable event, not even reported by the local newspapers. The hope had been to develop KEK Tarakan as part of a national government programme to establish centres of economic growth

1 The Indonesian name for a special economic zone is *kawasan ekonomi khusus*, abbreviated as KEK. It is also the name of the current Indonesian programme for establishing SEZs (see https://kek.go.id/).

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in less developed parts of Indonesia, such as the borderlands on the island of Borneo. The initially ambitious project was stranded on disagreements between national and regional governments as well as a lack of serious interest from the industries it was supposed to support.[2]

Why did this particular development zone never materialise at a time when SEZs are proliferating across Indonesia as well as in borderlands around Southeast Asia? Our argument in this chapter is twofold. We argue that the borderland surrounding Tarakan can be analysed as a de facto development zone. It turned out that there simply was no widespread local need for a SEZ to be established, because most of the formal benefits of such a zone were already there in practice. On the contrary, the local government and businesses were wary that a formal SEZ might bring increased scrutiny and control from the national government in Jakarta. The second part of our argument is that this de facto development zone is multigenerational and has been undergoing a continual process of reconstruction and deconstruction for a long time. The borderlands surrounding Tarakan have been experiencing a genealogy of developments going through a cycle of booms and busts, which have been related and enabled by each other.

In this chapter, we will first summarise the history of development zones in Indonesia as well as introduce the academic debates according to which we will subsequently analyse the genealogy of developments in the second part of this chapter.

Development Zones in Indonesia

Indonesia has pursued a strategy of constructing development zones in various forms since the late 1980s, when the SIJORI[3] Growth Triangle was established as a cooperation between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. It later became the Batam Free Trade Zone (Batam FTZ), catering especially to the low-skilled and labour-intensive garment and electronics assembly industries (Wulandari 2012, 18). Then, in the late 1990s, some forty new integrated economic development zones[4] (KAPET) were established across

2 Data for this study were collected by Thomas Mikkelsen during two fieldwork periods between late 2016 and early 2018, totalling eleven months. The work was done under the auspices of the RISEZAsia project (https://projects.au.dk/risezasia/) with funding from the Aarhus University Research Foundation (AUFF).

3 SIJORI is an acronym for Singapore, Johor, Republik Indonesia. Johor is the southernmost of the Peninsular Malaysia states.

4 In Indonesian, *Kawasan Pengembangan Ekonomi Terpadu* or KAPET.

eastern Indonesia. These zones were intended to be "growth centres" for the regions in which they were created by offering an array of tax incentives to any foreign companies establishing production in them (World Bank 2019a, 20). Planned under the New Order regime, it was initially a centrally managed project, with little involvement of the affected districts. The project was continued through and after the fall of President Suharto's New Order regime in 1998 and the subsequent process of administrative decentralisation in Indonesia (Temenggung 2013, 215-217).

One study (Rothenberg et al. 2017) has found that although the programme reduced tax burdens on firms in the KAPET districts, there were few or no spill-over effects when compared with non-KAPET districts. There was no added economic growth; only negligible in-migration and no substantial changes in economic activity across sectors in the KAPET districts. While the programme was beset by both the Asian Financial Crisis and the wave of decentralisation following the end of the New Order regime, Rothenberg et al. deem it probable that firms taking advantage of the KAPET programme in marginal areas would have or were already settled there anyway, as insufficient market access and infrastructure prohibited new companies from taking advantage of the possibilities offered by KAPET, despite the tax incentives available (Rothenberg et al. 2017, 3).

In the mid-2000s, the national government worked on formulating a new initiative to rejuvenate the development of SEZs across the country. The idea that development zones would lead to increased prosperity in the outer regions was still prominent in government discourse and local imaginaries of new beginnings, despite the poor results of earlier programmes. In 2009, a programme called KEK was launched. Contrary to the ill-fated KAPET, the KEK programme required regional governments themselves to submit proposals to establish KEKs, in order to "avoid lack of ownership […] on the part of regional governments" (World Bank 2019a, 23). The zones were to be jointly managed by the regions and the newly formed National SEZ Council,[5] although the national council would still have the final say in disputes in the organisational structure of SEZ management (KEK 2020).

Broadly speaking, the Indonesian KEK programme is in most ways straight out of the SEZ playbook. The most important benefits for foreign companies establishing production and investing in a KEK are: i) corporate income tax reductions of up to 100% for up to 25 years depending on the size of the investment; ii) value-added tax exemptions on luxury goods

5 *Dewan Nasional Kawasan Ekonomi Khusus.*

imported and exported to and from other KEKs; iii) custom exceptions on most goods entering the KEK and leaving it to other countries; iv) exemption from excise duties and import duties on goods imported into the SEZ; and v) streamlined visa requirements for foreign workers (KEK 2020).

The KEK programme was incorporated into the long-term development plan of the Yudhoyono administration in 2011 and has been continued by the current Jokowi administration (2014-present).

Figure 11.1 Locations of proposed KEKs I and II



Map © Thomas Mikkelsen

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The Zone that Never Was

The preparation for establishing KEK Tarakan began as early as 2007, two years before the programme officially launched. At that time, the local economy was buoyant due to a local boom in farmed shrimp and Tarakan was still part of the province of East Kalimantan; one of the richest provinces in Indonesia due to its immense reservoir of natural resources, including oil, coal, timber, and palm oil. KEK Tarakan was planned alongside another KEK in East Kutai, under one application.[6] The mayor of Tarakan at the time, Jusuf Kerang Asim, had branded Tarakan as "Little Singapore" and sought to emulate the development that Singapore had gone through "from village to city […] using our strategic geography, strong economy […] and deep sea port".[7] After a visit from then president of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the city changed its motto to "New Singapore". The lure of the "zone", argues Jonathan Bach (2011), "draws from its discursive power as a modernist fantasy of rationality and new beginnings" (Bach 2011, 99). Indeed, a KEK fit very well into the "New Singapore" policy of the Tarakan administration and not least the visions of modernity imagined by the central government.

Then in 2012, the city of Tarakan together with the four northernmost provinces of East Kalimantan split and formed North Kalimantan, the newest province in Indonesia (Hill 2014, 3). The work towards KEK Tarakan continued under the next mayor, Udin Hianggio, with numerous studies and proposals being made. Although studies prepared by the Tarakan KEK task force showed great economic possibilities in the zone, the team did not manage to attract any outside investment. Even though KEK Tarakan was planned to cater to the main industry of Tarakan, shrimp aquaculture, the industry was not interested in sponsoring such a grand development project at this early stage.[8]

There were several disagreements between the Tarakan KEK task force and the KEK board in Jakarta. Officially these disagreements were on the size and placement of the zone in Tarakan, with the most important being on who would manage the income from the zone once it was established. As we discuss below, past resource extraction regimes under the firm control of the central government in Jakarta reminded the local government in Tarakan of the importance of upholding firm regional autonomy in matters of resource extraction and the associated flow of revenue.

6 Personal communication 22 December 2016 (former KEK task force).
7 Personal communication 3 March 2017 (Jusuf SK, former mayor).
8 Personal communication 22 December 2016 (former KEK task force).

The local government wanted to use two smaller (295 ha in total) areas for the KEK, both the sites of older developments in this borderland: one to the north of the city, located in an area of abandoned shrimp ponds (KEK I), the other south of the city, taking advantage of an abandoned cold storage facility (KEK II; see figure 11.1). This option was much less expensive for the city and the plan was to increase the size of the two zones in the future if necessary. The national KEK board advised strongly against splitting a KEK in two and were also critical of the small size of the initial proposed zones, preferring an initial size of at least 500 ha. This, however, was deemed too expensive and dismissed by the Tarakan KEK-task force.[9]

The rents to be collected from the companies that would eventually be established in the KEK were also a point of contention. The national KEK board insisted that income from any KEK should be managed by them in Jakarta and then redistributed back to the region or city in question, a very similar arrangement to past resource extraction regimes under President Suharto. The KEK task force in Tarakan was very suspicious of this, as it suspected that Jakarta would withhold income or only transfer it back partially.[10] These issues were never solved and were brought up again and again over the course of the preparation process. Local government wanted full control over the zone if they were to buy and develop the amount of land required, something that the national KEK board would not accept.[11] Internally in the local administration, disagreements increased over time and a group calling for the idea of KEK Tarakan to be abandoned grew in size. Indeed, they argued that the city government should support local businesses instead of large foreign ones.[12]

During the campaign for mayor of Tarakan in 2015, the two factions for and against the KEK supported different candidates. Once the votes had been counted, it was clear that the group in favour of KEK Tarakan had lost their benefactor. Funding was quickly cut and after a few months the project was shelved and the leading members of KEK Tarakan were "promoted" to other less prestigious offices, or left the local administration completely.[13] Instead, work started on applying for a "centre for small and medium-sized enterprises" (SIKIM),[14] still a joint national and regional government-funded project, but smaller (4.5 ha), much less ambitious and fundamentally different in its goals. Whereas the KEK had aimed at

9 Personal communication 27 December 2016, A (BAPPEDA).

10 Personal communication 22 December 2016 (former KEK task force).

11 Personal communication 27 December 2016, A (BAPPEDA).

12 Personal communication 27 December 2016, B (DIPERINDAKOP).

13 personal communication 23cDecember 2016 (former KEK task force).

14 *Sentra Industri Kecil dan Menengaa.*

attracting foreign investment, the SIKIM aimed at supporting struggling small local industries. The planned Tarakan SIKIM will provide two years of rent-free workshop space and access to tools for up to twenty-six artisanal shipwrights and carpenters (Fokus-Borneo, 2020).

The shipbuilders in particular face considerable competition from Malaysia, where boats are cheaper and better, according to many fishermen. As one of the officers in charge of the SIKIM explained, supporting the local boat builders was a deliberate choice: "With the SIKIM focusing on shipbuilding, our fishermen can get better boats and get better results [than their Malaysian counterparts]".[15] At the time of finishing this chapter (August 2020), the Tarakan SIKIM was still under construction.

Borderlands and Development Zones

The city of Tarakan is located on an island off the north-eastern coast of Borneo, less than 90 km from Malaysia and much farther away from any other major Indonesian city. In its many markets, one can pay in Indonesian rupiah as well as in Malaysian ringgit, which are in some places even preferred. In 2016, the situation was so grave, according to the head of customs in East Kalimantan,[16] that he felt the need to write an opinion piece in the largest English-language newspaper in Indonesia, complaining that people in North Kalimantan not only attain their luxury items from Malaysia, but even "staple foods [...], such as rice, sugar, fruit, vegetables, meat, chicken, milk, and eggs, as well as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)" (*Jakarta Post* 2016).[17]

The concerns expressed by the head of customs in Tarakan reflect a much broader and widespread government anxiety about the Indonesian borderlands as especially "sensitive" and "unruly" places beyond central state control. Here border citizens are often depicted as less loyal towards the nation-state given their long-standing social and economic cross-border ties and thus in dire need of strong control and socio-economic inclusion (Eilenberg 2012, 2016). As discussed by Hargyono (this volume), the Indonesian borderlands on the island of Borneo have recently attracted increased attention from Jakarta in attempts to recolonise the margins

15 Personal communication 27 December 2016, A (BAPPEDA).

16 In 2016, the head of customs in Tarakan was still based in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, along with a number of other institutions, as North Kalimantan was not yet deemed to have sufficient administrative capacity (and because East Kalimantan was reluctant to let go of these privileges).

17 For other examples, see *Borneo-Today* (2017) or *The Star* (2017).

through accelerated development planning. However, such grand plans tend to decelerate and fall into ruin when plans do not materialise, fail, or are suspended indefinitely (see also Rippa, this volume).

State-led and tightly regulated development zones, such as the eventually failed KEK Tarakan, have been proliferating in number since their advent in the 1950s and 1960s, from 79 in 1975, to 3,500 in 2006 (Boyenge 2007, 1) and 5,400 in 2019 (World Bank 2019b). Despite their increasing number, their tangible economic effects on the wider regions where they have been established are debatable and difficult to assess (World Bank 2017). Development zones promise "a frictionless space in which the economy can perform optimally with minimal government interference" (Bach 2011, 107). Ong (2000, 57) has described the SIJORI development zone mentioned above and has analysed how in development zones "some aspects of state power and authority are taken up by foreign corporations", through what she terms graduating sovereignty, creating "neoliberal spaces" where state power can be withdrawn temporarily, granting investors a wide-reaching economic autonomy that is hoped to bring development to the surrounding regions. We find that such spatial variability in state power may be the case in the proposed KEK Tarakan to some extent as well, but in a somewhat inversed form. Certainly, the Indonesian Government would have been relatively well entrenched in the KEK Tarakan through its national KEK board compared with how relatively weak it is in the rest of the surrounding borderland. In other words, KEK Tarakan would have been an island of state control within a de facto development zone.

Dennis Arnold (2012, 748) regards border SEZs in Mekong countries not as "neoliberal spaces" but as local manifestations of broader national borderland state practices that are simultaneously enabling in some aspects and restricting in others. Thus, argues Arnold, we should not neglect how these specific borderland SEZs expand and reinforce state power in areas hitherto outside of their reach. In our case, whether KEK Tarakan would have been a conduit for projecting state power into the borderlands surrounding Tarakan will remain unanswered, as it never came to be. Instead, the planned but never implemented KEK have added yet another chapter to a genealogy of developments that have taken place or failed in this de facto, multigenerational development zone over the centuries.

A Genealogy of Developments

In the de facto development zone, different generations of extraction succeed each other, creating commodity flows that connect far-off places. These developments create certain landscapes, which linger even after extractive regimes have ceased or moved elsewhere (Tsing 2015, 6). In places where large-scale successive resource extraction has taken place, a corresponding succession of large-scale altered landscapes become layered upon each other, each depositing a testament to the actions of the past: the large-scale development of resources creates large-scale ruins. These testaments, or ruins, are not inactive legacies. Instead, they tie the choices of the past together with the possibilities of tomorrow (Paprocki 2019), directing possible ways forward while also "creat[ing] a sense of irretrievability or of futures lost" (Stoler 2013, 21). In Tarakan, reefs have been dynamited, oil wells have been drilled, mangroves have been cut, seafloors torn up, waterways diverted. Each cycle of development takes something away, while the rest is either left or repurposed and reconfigured in new ways. The proposed KEK Tarakan was planned on partly abandoned shrimp ponds and it would have incorporated the still usable infrastructure of a derelict cold storage, both ruins of past developments.

What ties these separate generations of development together into a genealogy is a fabric of interlacing social relations of exchange, debt, and mutual obligations. Where physical infrastructure represents one leg of the developments that allowed for the extraction and movement of resources over space (Larkin 2013, 327), patronage networks[18] in varying forms constitute the other. Patronage in broad terms has been used to describe Indonesian politics from a broad national level (Aspinall 2013; Van Klinken 2009; Nordholt 2015) to more specific analyses of regional politics, conflict, and resource extraction (Pelras 2000; Wilson 2013). In the borderland de facto development zone, the durability and flexibility of long-standing reciprocal patron-client relations spanning across borders have outlived both regime changes and war and have played significant roles in booms and busts in resource extraction (Eilenberg 2012).

In the next part of this chapter, we will trace the genealogy of developments that have taken place in this de facto development zone, to put the failed development of KEK Tarakan into a historical perspective. Within a waxing and waning field of tension between centre and periphery, past and present, developments in the borderlands connected through patron-client networks have created ruins that have enabled certain futures while restricting others.

18 The literature on patronage or patron-client relationships is large and broad. For a thorough introduction, see Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984).

Early Developments

Historical sources of economic activity in the area around Tarakan, which we term a de facto development zone, are sparse until the early 1800s, when the Sulu Sultanate assumed hegemony over much of the Sulu and Sulawesi seas, Tarakan included. As a thalassocracy, the Sulu found themselves to be in the centre of an extremely profitable trade route going north to China and beyond, east to the Philippines and south to the rest of the archipelago. The Sulu maintained complicated hierarchical structures of patronage across their territory, where vassals, clients, and slaves, were tasked with collecting and paying tribute to their Sulu masters, which were later traded with China (Tagliacozzo 2004; Warren 2007).

The Sulu exerted their power through controlling trade, which allowed them for a long time to defy Spanish, Dutch, and British colonial powers. This area, which James Francis Warren (2007) terms “the Sulu Zone”, was characterised by several petty sultanates and strongmen, situated along the coasts, all owing their positions to the protection they bought from the Sulu with the commodities they could collect from their own clients and allies upstream.

Tarakan was one such port; a hub for the trade of upriver forest products, especially bird nests, wax, and gold dust. The port was ruled by dynasties of strongmen alternating their allegiance through intermarriage and tribute with whichever patron was the strongest. South and north of Tarakan were similar sultanates and ports, embroiled in constant conflict over access to the upriver produce, which translated into protection and status. The Sulu often intervened in local politics to change or maintain a favourite ruler (Sellato 2001, 21; Warren 2007, 86). Territorial control was not the goal for these downriver strongmen and often their direct power of influence ceased at the very boundaries of their towns, which were built in easily defensible areas, such as on islands or hills in estuaries. Communities in the vicinity of these kingdoms were subordinate to them, but further upstream the kingdoms relied on networks of patron-client relations to funnel valuable goods to their ports and further on to Sulu or Bugis trading ships (Warren 2007, 84-90).

The extraction of commodities created resource frontiers and ruined environments as early as the eighteenth century and very possibly earlier than that, although at a much smaller scale than the frontiers of today. Competition for the most productive swallow caves led to wars and the overexploitation of productive caves along the coast (Okushima 2002), the systematic collection of sea cucumbers led to local extinctions in popular reefs (Máñez and Ferse 2010, 5) and intensive pearling denuded once abundant pearl oyster beds in the Sulu Sea (Butcher 2004, 130-132). These early developments spanned large areas of Tarakan and led to localised ruination and depletion through an infrastructure of extraction and trade based on pyramidal patronage networks.

The former client sultanates on the east coast of Borneo subsisted as independent entities until the Dutch arrived. Over a period of ten years, the Dutch forced the sultans to sign a series of agreements which by 1910 transformed the local aristocracies into (more or less) paid administrators in the Dutch colonial state, with their lands incorporated, at least in effect, into the Dutch East Indies (Black 1985). Even though the Dutch placed administrators in the courts and reinforced trading posts, they initially controlled only tiny enclaves.

The Oil Frontier

But Tarakan was special. Here, oil was found by Dutch geologists as early as 1897 – it was said that one could smell the reservoirs without even digging (Lindblad 1985, 88) – and soon this de facto development zone attracted the full attention of the Dutch colonial state. Production started in 1906 (Wight, Hare, and Reynolds 1992, 266) and the output proceeded to exceed one million tons a year by 1924. Meanwhile, the population of the island skyrocketed. Dutch engineers brought thousands of Javanese and Chinese workers to the island and also started drilling on neighbouring islands and in the shallow waters of the estuaries. In 1924, some twelve thousand people worked in the oil industry on Tarakan, which produced a third of all oil in the Dutch East Indies (Lindblad 1989). The oil companies built roads, a harbour, and an airstrip as well as simple housing for the thousands of labourers who were brought there. Large swathes of land were cleared, and a landscape dominated by the oil infrastructure of pipelines, oil derricks, and storage tanks arose. Extravagant villas for the Dutch administrators and engineers were constructed on the hills overlooking the oil fields and the harbour was considerably expanded.

The oil industry changed the physical as well as the demographic landscape of Tarakan. The indigenous Tidung, who before the oil rush had been the majority, became outnumbered by Javanese and Chinese coolies and very few of them ever worked in the oil fields. Instead, they continued to farm, fish, and collect the same commodities they had for centuries. Some profited by selling land to the Dutch whenever a new oil or gas find was made, but

Figure 11.2 What is today a grazing field for livestock was once the site of some of the most productive oil wells in Indonesia, attracting capital and labour from all over the world

Photo by Thomas Mikkelsen

many moved across the sound and up the rivers, away from Tarakan.[19] Chinese trading houses established before the advent of oil prospered, while new ones were established by immigrants attracted by the oil boom. The Chinese opened shops, trading houses, and brothels and in many cases acted as foremen and translators between the Dutch engineers and the Javanese coolies.[20] Tarakan was in effect run as an autonomous "development zone" by Bataafsche Petroleum Maaatchappij (BPM), a corporate joint venture consisting of two of the largest oil companies in the world at that time, the Royal Dutch and Shell, who built all infrastructure on the island. In this way, Tarakan was a "self-contained conclave of pioneers" (Lindblad 1989, 57).

The Japanese declared war on the Dutch East Indies on 10 January 1942 and landed troops on Tarakan the following day. The oil production facilities on the island were seen as vital, especially considering the fact that Tarakan crude oil could be used directly as fuel for the Japanese Navy should the need arise. Tarakan was the first landing point of Japanese soldiers in the Dutch East Indies and locals today somewhat proudly refer to the attack as "Indonesia's Pearl Harbour" (Santosa 2004). Nevertheless, the invasion had been anticipated and much of the oil infrastructure was destroyed by the

19 Personal communication 13 February 2017.

20 Personal communication 20 March 2017.

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Dutch before the Japanese attack. However, the Japanese managed to quickly increase production numbers once again and until late in the war, when most Japanese shipping had been destroyed, oil from Tarakan and Balikpapan to the south was the primary source of diesel fuel for the entire Japanese army (Grimes 1946, 8-11). After the war, Dutch assets were nationalised and extraction continued under a series of Indonesian state-owned companies. Despite a lot of prospecting and drilling, no new major reservoirs were found and production gradually decreased (Wight et al. 1992). In the following years, Tarakan fell out of the national limelight and returned to being regarded as a provincial backwater from the perspective of Jakarta.

Maritime Frontiers

In the 1970s, Japanese and Chinese businessmen financed factories called cold storage facilities along the east coast of Kalimantan to process and export frozen shrimp from fisheries to the Japanese market (Butcher 2004, 210-214). A cluster of these were located in Tarakan, the only developed port in the area. In these factories, the catch was cleaned, sorted, packaged, frozen, and stored for export. Compared with the domestic market, where shrimp were often consumed in dried or fermented form, the Japanese consumers craved fresh shrimp in large amounts. The cold storage facilities were thus produced exclusively for export, while the local markets were supplied by artisanal fishermen.

The old infrastructure from the oil boom rendered the construction of cold storages on Tarakan easy. The port and the airstrip secured the ready availability of the material and manpower needed to build and run the factories and many of the workers who had been working in the oil and gas industry became factory workers.[21]

Initially, the cold storages had their own fleets of company trawlers. In 1979, eighty such trawlers fished in the waters off Tarakan. Even though these wooden trawlers were relatively small when compared to international standards at the time, they were huge in comparison with the typical artisanal, non-motorised, small-scale fishing boat[22] and several orders of magnitude more effective. Data from the northern coast of Java show that while such trawlers constituted 2% of the fishing fleet, they accounted for

21 Personal communication, 7 March 2017.

22 Even in 1982, 82% of the Indonesian fishing fleet was comprised of sail-powered boats (Bailey, Dwiponggo, and Marahudin 1987, 76).

40% of the catch made between 1975 and 1979 (Bailey 1997, 228) and it can reasonably be assumed that the ratio was similar in the waters surrounding Tarakan.

Conflicts between artisanal fishermen and the larger trawlers quickly became frequent. When the protests turned violent, the New Order government of President Suharto first legislated against the presence of trawlers in coastal waters (Bailey 1997, 229). As this soon turned out to be impossible for the authorities to implement, a general ban on trawl fishing was passed into legislation in 1980 and entered into effect in 1981. The pressure on fish stocks lessened only for a while, though, as an ever-increasing number of small-scale fishing boats led to an eclipse of the size of pre-ban landings in 1984 (Bailey 1997, 231). Reacting to the trawl ban, the cold storage facilities changed their mode of operation, from relying on the catches of their own fleets, to organising small-scale fishermen as suppliers. The fleet of trawling vessels were sold off or converted for the use of other forms of equipment. This state territorialisation of the hitherto open fisheries frontier occurred as (and maybe because) catches were already dwindling.

The industry quickly adapted to this new situation. Inspired by the contract farming schemes that had been promoted by the World Bank in the Indonesian plantation sector since the 1960s (Cramb and McCarthy 2016), the government started subsidising so-called nucleus estate schemes (NES) in the fishery sector. In this adapted NES model, the cold storage facilities acted as nuclei and the surrounding communities of small-scale fishermen the plasma. The cold storage facilities offered subsidised loans to fishermen so that they could procure boats, equipment, and supplies, repayable through the sale of their harvests, which they were then contractually obliged to sell to the factory as a form of contract fishing. The NES schemes were initially introduced in the state-owned companies, but soon some private ones followed suit (Nikijuluw, Naamin, and Sarjana 1994, 406-407). The NES schemes became popular in the fishery of tuna and other high-value species, but never really took hold in the shrimp fisheries, which were already collapsing due to the massive overfishing that had taken place.

Instead, the cold storage facilities combined the NES system with the local patron-client systems, through which artisanal fishermen had been organised (Fabinyi 2013; Ferse et al. 2012). Entrepreneur middlemen financed partly through loans from the cold storage facilities, set up trading posts and started buying shrimp from independent fishermen. These middlemen were almost exclusively immigrant Bugis, who mobilised extended kin networks as client fishermen and assisted them with loans to buy and equip boats. For the cold storages, this meant a higher level of outsourcing of risk and responsibility

Figure 11.3 Thousands of tambaks – freshwater ponds for farming tiger shrimp – steadily proliferate up the rivers and waterways of North Kalimantan

Photo by Thomas Mikkelsen

than the pure NES schemes. For the fishermen, this meant lower margins, but opportunities for much needed capital and the safety of credit during periods of bad catches. Soon villages grew up around the cold storage facilities, wives and daughters operated the production lines, and company stores owned by Chinese traders sold everything fisherman needed, on credit.

However, it quickly became clear that large-scale fishing for wild shrimp had become economically unfeasible due to the widespread ruination of the over-trawled seafloors. Therefore, the cold storage facilities started lending money to businessmen, who experimented with growing them in ponds along the rivers that flow into the sound of Tarakan and on the islets that dot the estuaries. Thus, the physical infrastructure and the social organisation of cold storage-financed patronage networks and outsourced production rendered the caught-shrimp frontier the springboard for the next boom in the de facto development zone.

The Arrival and Decline of Farmed Shrimp

Using the same model of debt-based patronage and rejecting the company ownership of ponds completely, the number of ponds and middlemen increased steadily as produced shrimp overtook caught shrimp in weight and value. The shrimp were fed into global supply chains, terminating in Japan, the United States, and Europe.

Once meandering freely through mangrove forests, streams now became part of the pond infrastructure, with sluice gates, dykes, and embankments all built to manage water flow in and out of the ponds during ebb and flood tides. This lunar heartbeat drove the farming of shrimp, allowing caretakers to empty and fill ponds and making it possible to harvest an entire filled pond through a sluice gate with a single net. The landscape was painstakingly developed into large-scale shrimp aquaculture through piling, pushing, and digging the muddy mangrove soil into embankments no more than a couple of metres across, forming the walls of each pond. Ponds slowly spread across the island of Tarakan, creating a landscape that was much more densely inhabited than the mangrove swamp it replaced, each pond connected through the waterways feeding them, the embankments containing them and ultimately through the shrimp commodity chain to consumers across the border in Malaysia and from there all over the world.

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, which in Indonesia contributed to the eventual fall of the New Order regime, paradoxically meant windfall profits for export-oriented extractive industries trading in dollars. The plummeting rupiah decreased expenditure dramatically (Gunawan 2012, 72), and the farm gate price of shrimp doubled or tripled almost overnight. "Unused" land suddenly became something with potential; a "space of desire"; a space that, once seen, had to be explored and exploited (Tsing 2003, 5102). The ready availability of land was considered to be one of the strengths of the grown shrimp industry in North Kalimantan. Nevertheless, the land was not readily available in the eyes of everyone. Rather, it is and was used by people who had lived there for generations, people who did not benefit from the pond development. Old rights and claims to the mangroves came under pressure as estuaries were developed. Gradually the people who had been living and fishing along the estuaries for generations were excluded and the mangroves themselves were transformed. With the Tidung left clinging to the riverbanks as "surplus populations" (Li 2010, 68), struggles about ownership continued among the initial claimants.

Pond entrepreneurs had to go through precious little paperwork in order to start developing. Indonesian land law is a complicated and contentious affair and we will not go into the details here.[23] Suffice to say, current forestry

23 For a good introduction to Indonesian land law, see McCarthy and Robinson (2016) or Indrarto et al. (2012) . For a more thorough review, see Slaats et al. (2009).

laws are contradictory and there is no complete map[24] of Indonesia depicting all concessions, plots, and land-use zones. Often, different government agencies will grant overlapping concessions, leading to situations where two competing claims to a single plot of land can both be legal (Indrarto et al. 2012, 22-27). Recently, as the first step in this process, the Department of Fisheries have begun requiring so-called land clarification letters for newly established ponds. Although these do not clarify ownership in any way, these letters state that there are no conflicting claims over the plot of land in question. During fieldwork in 2018, only a few demonstration ponds run by cold storage facilities had such letters. In the words of one officer tasked with issuing such certificates, "We are only two officers tasked with this. We do what we can, but there is no way we can check all of those ponds".[25] Thus, the authority to define who has claim and usage rights to ponds primarily lies among the collection of owners and bosses themselves. Owners of cold storage facilities are indifferent as long as they can process and export shrimp. Ponds are bought and sold without much involvement of local or national government and the majority of ponds exist with no formalised legal basis, despite it being prioritised by the national government.

Christian Lund describes the dynamics of local authorities, entities not directly affiliated with the state, but making decisions of a public nature and exercising political power (Lund 2006, 686-687). He terms them "twilight institutions" and describes how they bolster their power and authority through references to the state, in this case the practice of buying tillage letters from village leaders and using them as proof of ownership.[26] This, Lund argues, has the paradoxical effect of simultaneously circumventing and strengthening the authority of the state (here, local government) through using its paraphernalia. If we consider the supply chains as having some characteristics of Lund's twilight institutions, despite being a loose conglomerate of relations tied together through cold storages and patronage links, the foot-dragging and tacit acceptance of the status quo by the local government makes sense: it highlights the primacy of the supply chain as the source of public authority when it comes to matters of pond ownership. The fact that pond owners do not pay taxes invariably leads to lower operating costs for the cold storages and thus a greater margin of profit. Even though few pond owners pay taxes (Indonesia 2018), the whole industry surrounding

24 One such database has been in the process of construction since 2011, but is still not complete (World Bank 2018).

25 Personal communication, 20 March 2018 (Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan).

26 For a similar case from the Mahakam delta in East Kalimantan, see Timmer (2010, 709-710).

the shrimp supply chain constitutes the second-largest source of city income in Tarakan today, after the service sector (Badan Pusat Statistik-Tarakan 2018, 11). However, it is not only from such a vantage point that private actors and local government are connected and reinforce each other in the de facto development zone. It is very common that government employees, especially those in related departments, are pond entrepreneurs themselves.[27]

The confusion between (or one could say the combination of) the legal and the illegal is one of the characteristics of the de facto development zone, as is the fluidity between public and private. It is a fertile space for capital, deals, and plans ever enticing and full of promises and there are great gains to be had if one has the means and the courage (Tsing 2003, 5104). Today, the ponds extend from the tidal limit of the major rivers, along the numerous tributary streams and rivulets, all the way to the estuaries, including the numerous islets situated in the river mouths, in all totalling some 21,000 ha.

However, over time, the older ponds have slowly become unproductive, disease-ridden and clogged with the waste of millions upon millions of shrimps. Pond aquaculture is infamous for being susceptible to dramatic collapses due to virus epidemics (Cribb and Ford 2009, 9-10; Flegel 1997, 433-435; Walker and Mohan 2009, 125). Occasionally, sweeping epidemics wipe out shrimp in entire regions. The frequency of failed harvests is increasing all the time and whole areas of unproductive ponds are being abandoned and left to fall into ruin; some of the cold storages here were abandoned, too. It was on such ruins that part of KEK Tarakan would have been built, had it ever materialised.

What the next development will bring, no one knows. This genealogy might at first glance give the impression that a new boom is always around the corner and that the current bust is only temporary: that it is just a question of finding the next boom crop, preferable before anyone else. What we see is the opposite: each cycle of boom and bust leaves the world a poorer place, narrowing the possibilities for future generations. The caves where swallows made their nests are gone. The pearl oyster beds are gone. The tropical hardwood is gone. The oil is gone. The fantastic abundance of fish is gone, and so are the mangroves once teeming with life.

Concluding Remarks

KEK Tarakan, the planned SEZ in the border city of Tarakan, never materialised. Despite seven years of preparation, the grand development project

27 Field notes, 17 March 2018.

that should have heralded a new future for the city never found any traction among the industry to which it was supposed to cater, as it drowned in disagreements both internal and between the regional and the national government. The plan's abandonment was fairly unspectacular and in its place an even more unspectacular government programme for a few somewhat reluctant artisanal woodworkers was established.

We argue that in this borderland area, the planned KEK Tarakan would paradoxically have been not the island of sovereign exception commonly associated with SEZs, but rather a zone where the central government would have had comparably more control than the surrounding borderlands. This leads us to argue that the entire borderland surrounding Tarakan is a de facto development zone in itself. In the de facto development zone today, companies extract and export commodities with minimal state interference, mirroring past generations of developments. Central state authority and interest have waxed and waned in these borderlands but have always been contested throughout the genealogy of development. The de facto development zone has for centuries been a place of boom and bust in resource extraction, causing ruined landscapes, and leaving behind ruined infrastructure, both of which have in turn been both restricting and enabling in subsequent developments.

Local and transborder patronage networks have fused with supply chains spanning continents to funnel products to consumers all over the world. In doing so, development has kept living standards for a legion of caretakers, fishermen, and indebted pond owners low, while a tiny minority have accumulated capital at an unbelievable rate as clients of a handful of international companies. In the de facto development zone, flows foster and strengthen heterogeneity and preserve and accentuate difference rather than dissolving it (Tsing 2016, 330), reinforcing it and relying on non-capitalist forms of organisation such as debt-based patronage. Some people are able to turn this friction to their advantage, while others experience it as pure erosive destruction.

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