Autonomy, Identity, and ‘Illegal’ Logging in the Borderland of West Kalimantan, Indonesia

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Borderland identity and traditional community autonomy affect the practice of ‘illegal’ logging and the impact of regional autonomy among the Iban along the upper Kapuas borderland in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. We examine these issues with attention to the historical development of the Kalimantan Iban as a border people, their struggle to maintain control over their traditional forest resources under the fluctuating power of the Indonesian state and their approaches in dealing with regional and cross-border interests in the harvesting of their forests.

Keywords: Borderlands; Illegal Logging; Regional Autonomy; Iban; West Kalimantan

Introduction

In April 2000, on the Indonesian side of the international border between West Kalimantan and Sarawak, Malaysia, lorries loaded with sawn log blocks (balok) lined the heavily rutted road as they made their way toward the crossing into Malaysia. The logs, considered by the central Indonesian government to be illegally harvested and exported, came from numerous cutting sites in the lowland Dipterocarp forest along the border road, forests within the territories of local Iban communities of the Kapuas Hulu district. At the head of one path leading to a cutting site, with balok piled on the side for pick-up, stood a hand-painted sign which read: ‘CV Munggu Keringit Sdn Bhd’. Perhaps at first glance this sign signifies little, but, examined more closely, it represents an important local perspective that must be taken into account...
for a more complete picture of currently rampant ‘illegal’ logging in Indonesia generally and the borderlands of Kalimantan specifically.1

‘CV’ stands for ‘limited partnership’ in Indonesia (from the Dutch Commanditaire Vennootschap), while ‘Sdn Bhd’ means virtually the same thing across the border (from Sendirian Berhad in Malaysian). ‘Munggu Keringit’ simply referred to a nearby hill. Such a designation had no legal standing and was intended as a joke, but it very effectively summed up the ambiguous position held by borderland residents engaged in co-operative logging with Malaysian timber entrepreneurs. The sign conveyed the message that these borderlanders would continue to look to both sides in their efforts to secure their livelihood, as they have since the border’s creation 150 years ago.

Since the onset of the Indonesian economic crisis (krismon) in 1997, ‘illegal’ logging has increased quite dramatically across the country. Even prior to the implementation of formal regional autonomy (otonomi daerah or otda) in 2001, the power vacuum left after the end of Suharto’s New Order regime resulted in de facto regional autonomy, and otda itself continues to facilitate these logging and export activities, especially through the expanded power of district heads (bupati) to grant small logging concessions. In West Kalimantan, these activities have included the export of timber along historical trade routes across the porous international border into Sarawak, Malaysia. As elsewhere in the archipelago, the long-term consequences of these activities for both people and forests remain unclear, though the signs certainly are ominous.

A voluminous literature has developed in recent years as researchers have examined various aspects of regional autonomy and the booming trade in ‘illegally’ harvested timber (Casson 2001; Casson & Obidzinski 2002; Currey & Ruwindrijarto 1999, 2000; EIA/Telapak 2001, 2004; Gullison et al. 2001; Jarvie et al. 2003; McCarthy 2000, 2002; Obidzinski & Barr 2003; Smith et al. 2003; World Resources Institute 2002). Although these studies often take into account the multi-dimensional nature of the issue, with concerns ranging from high-level governmental corruption to local-level community economic needs, more central anthropological concerns about identity and social organisation are rarely explored. These are, however, no less important to consider than more frequently researched aspects of the overall problem.

In this paper, we consider how an identity as borderlanders and a traditional social organisation stressing community autonomy influence the practice of ‘illegal’ logging and the impact of regional autonomy along the upper Kapuas borderland in the vicinity of Danau Sentarum National Park (DSNP). Drawing on recent field research among the Iban,2 we examine these issues with respect to the historical development of the Kalimantan Iban as a border people, their struggle to maintain control over their traditional forest resources under the Indonesian state, and their approaches in dealing with regional and cross-border interests in the harvesting of their forests. We do recognise, however, that events can move rather rapidly, and, since our last
fieldwork in 2003, there have been several important developments, which we address in the conclusion.

The Iban of Northwestern Borneo

The Iban are a widespread population in northwestern Borneo, occupying large portions of the Malaysian state of Sarawak with smaller populations along the border in the Indonesian province of West Kalimantan and in Brunei. There are around 600,000 self-identified Iban in Sarawak, roughly one-third of the state population; in contrast, only about 14,000 live in West Kalimantan, a minority among minorities in the ethnically diverse province. Most Kalimantan Iban inhabit four subdistricts along the international border in District Kapuas Hulu, with smaller communities elsewhere in the district and in the major urban areas of the province (Figure 1).

The Iban have traditionally practised longhouse domicile, whereby a set of generally closely related families live in separate apartments within what appears to be a single structure. Within the community, each household has the responsibility for its own economic production and consumption, but relies on aid from the other households in the event of labour shortages or harvest failure. The longhouse

![Figure 1: The Upper Kapuas Borderland](image)
community usually holds exclusive rights over a geographically defined territory, and is politically and ritually autonomous from neighbouring longhouses. In West Kalimantan, under the state-imposed desa-dusun system of political organisation beginning in the 1980s, longhouses were clustered together under elected leaders. This has proven confusing and unwieldy for the Iban, for the authority a kepala desa from one longhouse can have over other longhouses (not to mention his own) is highly limited, and the building of consensus over dispersal of desa stipends has been much more difficult. In practice, longhouses have continued to operate autonomously (see below).

The traditional economy of the Iban is based on a complex system of established agroforestry, its central component being the cultivation of rice in hill swiddens cut from long-fallowed forest and short-fallowed swamp swiddens within a longhouse territory. Iban have typically supplemented their subsistence farming with hunting, fishing, collecting forest products, tapping rubber, or cultivating pepper and working in wage labour. Wage labour generally has not been available locally, given the often isolated nature of Iban settlement. Furthermore, with the heavy involvement of women in rice production and their important domestic roles, it is more often the men who go off to work for wages. Men’s responsibilities to farming are periodic, and in the past they have been free after clearing fields and planting rice to leave home for extended periods (for example, to collect forest products for the market). The current need for money to buy rice after the occasional harvest failure, pay for children’s and siblings’ schooling and buy high-valued consumer goods, puts greater pressure on families to free up their men for wage work (Wadley 2000).

However, they cannot entirely abandon the farm economy, as the wages men earn are rarely enough to provide all subsistence needs. A common situation in many longhouses throughout the Iban population has been one of chronic male absence with some men returning after a few months of work, others after a year or more. In short, just as with rice farming and longhouse domicile, male wage-labour migration (or viewed differently as male absence) can be pervasive in daily Iban life. For the Kalimantan Iban, this labour migration has been across the international border to jobs in Malaysia and Brunei (Wadley 2000). For Iban in rural Sarawak, access to urban areas by road has improved their ability to commute to city jobs (Windle 2002, p. 826).

The Upper Kapuas Borderland

British and Dutch colonisation on Borneo partitioned the Kalimantan Iban from the larger population in Sarawak, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century with their efforts to suppress cross-border headhunting and define colonial citizenship. The Iban borderland was often the focus of contentious inter-colonial relations, and the Iban did their best to take advantage of differing terms and conditions that colonial rule offered on either side; for example, using the border to escape taxes and resist colonial authority (Wadley 2001). The independence of Indonesia and the formation
of the Malaysian federation in the mid-twentieth century only furthered the partition, particularly under Konfrontasi in the early 1960s and the subsequent Communist insurgency along the border into the 1970s. The economic disparities between Indonesia and Malaysia that developed during this period, along with the remoteness of Kapuas Hulu from Indonesian centres, kept the Kalimantan Iban economically oriented toward Malaysia, reinforced by their cultural and historical roots in Sarawak. The Asian economic crisis of 1997 and the dramatic political changes it spurred in Indonesia have only intensified this orientation.

Borders ‘invariably separate inequalities’ (Asiwaju 1983, p. 19), and borderlanders around the world generally exhibit a casual and enterprising attitude, given their need to be resourceful in exploiting changing border conditions. As a result they are often politically ambivalent and may develop interests that come into conflict with national interests on either side of a border. Borderlanders may thus find it acceptable to breech laws that they perceive as being at odds with cross-border interaction and therefore their own interests, such as in smuggling (Asiwaju 1985; Martinez 1994). The Iban position on the upper Kapuas borderland, adjacent to a more prosperous and politically stable neighbour, has meant that their interests lie partly across the border, where they not only find temporary employment but also occasionally places to migrate to permanently (Padoch 1982, p. 31; Wadley 2000). The ongoing boom in logging must be seen as part of this general circumstance and part of a mixed, local economic strategy.

However, this emphasis on the economic rationality of border ambiguity should not discount the role of identity, for identity is a critically important factor in local perceptions and decisions. With respect to the border, Iban identity may be seen, in some respects, as two parts of a whole: (1) being Iban and thus being connected through language and culture to a sizeable portion of Sarawak’s indigenous population and (2) being long-term native residents of a remote corner of the Indonesian state with its attendant pressures, but without the benefits, of citizenship and nationality. Yet, because of the suspicion with which the Indonesian state has viewed the Iban by virtue of their status as borderlanders, they exhibit a paradoxically shifting allegiance to the state (Kompas 2000c; Lumenta 2001; Pirous 2002). It may be strong, such as during the Communist insurgency when Iban men worked closely with the Indonesian military, or exceptionally weak, as it appears now. Sometimes this shifting allegiance is simultaneous; for example, with men holding Malaysian identity cards to ease working there while returning home for general elections. In numerous cases, families are split in their orientation, with some knowing almost nothing about Indonesian politics as a result of long-term work in Sarawak, while their siblings or children may be more ‘Indonesian’ from attending boarding school or university in the provincial capital, Pontianak.

This duality is in keeping with borderlander identity elsewhere (Martinez 1994, p. 305; Ominiyi 1997), and, as in many borderland situations, it is often a minority of the partitioned population that exhibits this identity complex. Whether Italian Swiss or Kalimantan Iban, there are contradictory pressures, while their kin on the other
side of the border do not face that ambiguity (Leimgruber 1991). Indeed, Sarawak Iban—even those living close to the border—do not show the borderland ‘mentality’ that their cousins across the border do. They may visit kin and marry people on the other side, but there is no pull from Kalimantan to be something other than Iban and Malaysian. Reference to the Indonesian side has most often come in the form of fear of the Indonesian state stemming from Konfrontasi and superiority with respect to their ‘rustic’ Kalimantan kin. More recently, however, with the growth of ‘illegal’ logging, Malaysian logging companies have used Sarawak Iban as ethnic liaisons and negotiators with local communities, but this may have more to do with taking advantage of ethnic ties than with any development of a transborder identity.

Regional Autonomy and ‘Illegal’ Logging

From the 1970s under Suharto’s national development programme, the government granted huge timber concessions throughout the archipelago. Following the Basic Forestry Law of 1967, these concessions were laid over and largely ignored local claims to land and forest, as they operated ‘in the national interest’ and therefore superseded local rights. In the West Kalimantan borderlands, these concessions involved Indonesian military connections derived from the earlier anti-insurgency efforts. One concession, PT Y amaker, combined economic exploitation with national security concerns, stretching almost the entire length of the West Kalimantan–Sarawak border.

During the heyday of concession logging in the 1980s and early 1990s, timber companies operated with broad, state-supported authority over the forests granted to them. In dealing with local communities, company agents often talked about gaining permission from the locals to log and promises of jobs and development, but even locals were generally aware that the companies did not need permission from them if they held government permits. Company representatives and their contractors paid token honoraria to local officials for their co-operation, and they made occasional but half-hearted gestures to aid affected communities. By the mid-1990s, the border area was facing the prospect of large-scale oil palm plantations and further local loss of access to traditional resources (Wadley et al. 2000).4

This situation continued until the onset of krismon in 1997, the ensuing fall of Suharto in 1998 and a series of new ‘reform’ governments. The new governments ended some concessions in the border area including that of PT Y amaker. Although moves had been made toward more regional autonomy even under Suharto, de facto autonomy became entrenched in the provinces as national power was shaky. The formal implementation of otda after 2000 only intensified the situation, as provincial-level government was sidestepped in favour of increased authority for bupati.5 With respect to logging, between 2001 and 2002 bupati used their authority widely to grant small-scale concessions of up to 100ha. For example, in 2001, the Kapuas Hulu bupati’s office processed as many as 123 applications for such small-
scale concessions (*Kalimantan Review* 2001, p. 20). However, even before that, significant logging was being conducted without official permits.\(^6\)

In the Kapuas Hulu borderland, much of the logging being carried out after 2000 has been through community co-operatives\(^7\) in locally worked-out agreements with Malaysian timber entrepreneurs, known as *tukei*.\(^8\) Co-operatives or co-ops are made up of several communities, often crossing *desa* boundaries and sometimes even excluding longhouses within *desa*. Their ostensible aim is the facilitation of joint development projects among the member communities, but so far the only activity co-ops have engaged in has been logging. Each co-op has a permit for establishing itself, and some of those currently engaged in logging may have permits from the *bupati* allowing cutting. Those that have built sawmills (some very small operations, others very large) claim to have permits from the Department of Industry. In the future, they may shift to plantation crops once all the marketable timber is gone.\(^9\)

In February 2000, there were no less than twelve small financiers from Sarawak operating in locations along the border from Nanga Badau to Lanjak, and their numbers have continued to grow into 2004. At least six of these *tukei* have built substantial sawmills near the main government road that runs north of DSNP; as a result, the area being logged has also expanded to accommodate these sawmills, especially into the upper Leboyan river area (in the vicinity of the Betung Kerihun National Park). Recent reports indicate that around 300 lorries, loaded with both *balok* and locally milled lumber, traverse the government road toward the border, some carrying wood from much further afield in the district. Because of this commerce, an estimated 70–80 per cent of the raw timber supply in Sarawak originates in West Kalimantan (*SDI* 2001, pp. 5, 13; *Jakarta Post* 2003).\(^10\)

Another consequence has been a booming border economy. As the non-farming population has expanded, locals have developed daily vegetable markets where women from nearby communities can sell produce; shops, cafes, bars, and hotels have proliferated in the market towns, and prostitutes from outside the area are now ubiquitous as they cater to the loggers. The presence of Malaysian-owned sawmills also provides access to sought-after Malaysian consumer goods at discount prices. Locals working at these sawmills are able to order goods through their employer, and company lorries bring back the goods after delivering their lumber. Also expanding has been the trade in endangered wildlife for pets (for example, infant orangutans) and medicines (for example, bear claws and gallbladders; cf. Wadley 1999), as well as rare orchids. These are usually acquired by loggers in the forest, and passed across the border through the sawmill operators.

An additional consequence, exacerbated by both *de facto* and formal regional autonomy, has been greatly increased corruption. *Tukei* and their local liaisons are said regularly to pay off local police, military, and subdistrict and district officials. In exchange, these civil servants turn a blind eye to the logging and daily export of wood across the border. In addition, at least one subdistrict office has issued some *tukei* Indonesian identity cards so they can operate more freely in the province (*Kompas* 2003). These problems are not just limited to the immediate area where logging is
being done: in 2000, one local businessman claimed that his co-op lacked a trade permit because he and his tukei refused to pay a Rp. 15 million (US$1,775) bribe to the Pontianak trade office issuing the permit. Some local residents unconnected to logging are increasingly bitter over this corruption, once again seeing the wealth of their forests going to outsiders.

For their part, local communities and co-ops receive commissions for the wood cut in their forests. As production has moved from transporting timber directly across the border to processing by local sawmills, each balok removed from an area is usually painted with red numbers indicating its community ‘ownership’; at the sawmill, these numbers are registered, with communities receiving commissions after that (though we cannot assume that commissions accurately reflect the amount of timber harvested). In 2000, this varied between US$2.52 and $4.46 per cubic metre, generally based on distance to the border. (Commissions are calculated locally in either Indonesian rupiah or Malaysian ringgit, but logs are measured in British tons, reflecting the dominance of Malaysian tukei, as well as the fact that border Iban, many of whom have worked for decades in the timber industry of Sarawak and Sabah, are more comfortable with it.) In addition to these payments, tukei give local representatives and contacts special fees, sometimes under the table, for continued good service (see below). These fees and commissions are certainly much more than communities ever received from logging companies in the past, and locals are still bitter over their lack of profit from past logging.11

During the initial years of the logging boom, locals were not hired for logging operations, although in one case local Iban women were trained as scalers, while some men worked as lorry drivers or tractor operators. One of the main reasons was because, prior to krismon, locals were used to getting much higher pay, often working at the same jobs in Malaysia. But this seems to have changed as Malaysia has tightened restrictions on foreign workers. Indeed, there is some indication that the numbers of local Iban working for logging companies is on the rise (Eilenberg 2003). However, most of the small-scale logging crews are from Sambas (a border district in the far west of the province); the workers are Malay, and their overseers are Sambas Chinese who have their own business and family connections with the Malaysian tukei. (This represents a largely unexplored cross-border connection.)

In the large-scale operations, such as those in the upper Leboyan River area, a high percentage of the workers in logging crews consist of Sarawak Iban, brought by tukei.12 Even more so than the Kalimantan Iban, these Iban usually have long experience working in the Malaysian timber industry and often special skills such as mechanics and drivers. Their presence, however, introduces an interesting social dynamic. Far away from their families, these men have sought company in local longhouses, and their hosts have welcomed the news, conversation, and consumer goods that they bring, in turn offering a ‘home-like’ feeling to their guests. There are numerous examples of Sarawak Iban creating strong friendships with local Iban, and, in some cases, actually bringing their families from Sarawak to live with local families. In addition, Sarawak Chinese working in the logging operations (many of whom
speak fluent Iban) often visit nearby longhouses to socialise after work. (As a result of these interactions, we expect an increase in marriages between Sarawak men and Kalimantan women.)

The presence of outsiders in the area presents an interesting contrast, one that further delineates the importance of local Iban identity. Although Sambas Malays are borderlanders in their own right, they remain cultural outsiders to local Iban; as a result, the Sambas Malay logging crews rarely visit Iban longhouses or socialise with locals in the same way Sarawak Iban and Chinese do. Indeed, Sambas crews live apart, and generally seek their entertainment in the market towns, where there are other (though more often local) Malays. In addition, both Sarawak Iban and Chinese may be found far from the Bornean border. For example, a colleague of ours met, purely by chance, an Iban heavy equipment operator on a logging operation in Cameroon (C. Colfer, pers. comm.), and others—both Iban and Chinese—have been arrested in West Papua (Jakarta Post 2004). Furthermore, loggers from Timor and Flores routinely visit local Kalimantan Iban longhouses, buy pigs and chickens and socialise with residents, their common Christianity being the culturally salient link. But to our knowledge, nowhere do the interpersonal relations and identification run as deep as they do between the border Iban, Sarawak Iban, and Chinese from Iban-dominated areas of Sarawak.

Disputes and Traditional Territories

Under recent political and economic conditions, local communities have been more emboldened and empowered to deal with economic change on their own, and they have been less than passive players, actively seeking out and negotiating with tukei. This has, however, divided some communities (for example, between those who do and do not want to participate in oil palm schemes), and led to the re-alignment of and challenge to local communities’ territorial boundaries.13 There have been a number of instances since the logging boom began of community disputes over forest, sometimes involving communities within the same co-op. In at least one case, the dispute was over forest land that had never been part of any traditional community territory. In some instances, disputes were settled by traditional cockfight with the winning community gaining possession of the contested forest but leaving the losers embittered. Locals recognise all this as a scramble to make claims on timber land so that local profits from logging might go to them. These cases also represent the confluence of a ‘rush’ economy and traditional Iban political organisation focused on the longhouse and its autonomy from similar communities, and, given the crosscutting ties of kinship and marriage between longhouses, it is not impossible that inter-longhouse disputes can feed internal divisions.

In one case during 2000, an Iban community refused to co-operate with logging operations, and the tukei intentionally created troubles between it and another Iban community that was co-operating (see also Media Indonesia 2000a). The tukei gave shotgun shells to people from the co-operating longhouse in order to intimidate their
neighbour. People from the first longhouse became aware of this situation and fired their shotguns at the sawmill camp owned by the tukei, located near the co-operating longhouse. Several people from the first community then wrote a letter to local government officials rejecting such foreign intrusions and stipulating that they would act alone if the government did not deal with the problem. We have no information on the outcome of this dispute.

A more recent example concerns the planned construction of a Malaysian sawmill in 2003. The company contacted the five Iban longhouses that made up one desa to negotiate a joint agreement to open logging and sawmill operations. The sawmill would be run as a desa co-operative with timber extracted from the longhouse territories. The company negotiators were mostly Sarawak Iban related to one longhouse’s headman. Being anxious to begin work, the company pushed hard for an agreement and promised high economic returns. At the last minute, however, the members of one community had second thoughts and pulled out of the negotiations. This effectively meant that the company could not build the sawmill or conduct logging, and so it left the area. People from the other longhouse communities were disappointed and angry, especially the ones with kin ties to the company. By the end of fieldwork, the dispute remained unresolved, and had created resentment among the communities.

The Iban have an anthropological reputation as being ‘egalitarian’ (Freeman 1981; Sather 1996), and, at the ideological level, this is certainly the case, with strong values of personal autonomy and achievement. As a result of those values, however, there can be substantial material and political differences between households within the same longhouse, the occasional source of resentment and disdain in internal relations. Under current circumstances, the greater access to outside information through better-established personal networks has allowed the generally more well-to-do Iban to monopolise access to tukei and their agents; knowledge of higher commissions paid to these local liaisons furthers already present resentment, and may exacerbate material inequalities. In one case in 2003, a tukei recruited members of several closely related households to build a new logging camp, without offering the opportunity to others within the longhouse. When the deal became public, the others expressed outrage at benefits of logging on community territory going to a select few, and some household heads threatened privately to move to other longhouses. To date, however, we know of no cases in which these feelings have resulted in anything other than grumbling.

Conclusion

In the borderlands of West Kalimantan, economic and political changes over the last several years have been most dramatically manifested in the heavy involvement of Malaysian timber companies in logging forests now under the tenuous control of local communities. The basic outline of this activity appears similar to other places in Indonesia where ‘illegal’ logging occurs (McCarthy 2000; Casson 2001), and
Malaysian logging enterprises operate in widely removed locations, from West Africa to West Papua. In few other places, however, except possibly other borderlands, has the configuration of borderland identity and local community autonomy come together to structure the patterns that we have reported here. To return to the ‘CV Munggu Keringit Sdn Bhd’ sign, we see, among the border Iban, not just a willingness to maintain diverse sources of livelihood in the face of great uncertainty, something most subsistence-level peoples practise, but an intimate knowledge of and association with the other side of the border, generated by the history of both ethnic partition and border inequalities.

Furthermore, traditional political autonomy of longhouse communities results in divergent interests between longhouses in the same desa or co-op. The implementation of otda in the area has weakened what little administrative power the desa system had and strengthened longhouse autonomy. In addition, even prior to otda, there was worry about severe environmental degradation and greater resource conflict resulting from formal autonomy, not to mention confusion over its implementation and very meaning (Down to Earth 2000; Media Indonesia 2000b). Now, while local communities have the power to manage their resources for and by themselves, they too are worried about the future of their natural resources, because of competition not only from timber and oil palm companies that might gain legally binding licenses to their forests but also from neighbouring and related communities. These threats appear to be one factor driving locals to allow logging in their forests, though communities are not equally enthusiastic about it. However, the ecological consequences of the current boom economy remain unstudied, though the current level of logging does not bode well for local forests and thus for local, forest-dependent livelihoods.

Recent developments underscore the vulnerability of locals in the face of outside interests in their forests. With millions of cubic metres of timber being smuggled into Malaysia annually (from throughout Indonesia), the country loses a substantial amount of taxable profit. Not surprisingly, the national and provincial governments have moved to criminalise ‘illegal’ logging, by making occasional police raids to arrest loggers and confiscate logs (though no ‘big operators’ have yet been caught), labelling tukei as ‘mafia’ and ‘gangsters’ in the media and threatening an emergency decree that would increase penalties for ‘illegal’ logging (Pontianak Post 2004; Suara Pembaruan 2004; Tempo 2004). Although the loss of revenue is an obvious motivation, these manoeuvres may also signal a nationalistic desire to claim back Indonesian territory and resources, as well as a national and provincial challenge to the autonomy that districts have enjoyed since otda. Nonetheless, it is not as if local communities are caught passively between these forces: local people remain active participants, as proponents and opponents of logging activities. Indeed, the border Iban hold a range of positions, from entrepreneurs co-operating with loggers to members of environmental groups promoting alternatives to forest extraction. These issues deserve further study.
The current boom in ‘illegal’ logging has challenged the exclusivity of the Indonesian–Malaysian border, and, as borderlanders, Kalimantan Iban again straddle the line, as they have in the past. Economic links between West Kalimantan and Sarawak have intensified over the past several years (Fariastuti 2002), and this has been especially so in the Kapuas Hulu borderland. Yet those ties have always been there, as have strong cultural and social relations. What makes this current set of cross-border relations different is not so much the direction of resource flow (still into Sarawak) as the physical presence of Sarawak enterprises competing for local resources. From the standpoint of resource extraction and forest habitat, the outcome may not be so different from Indonesian concession logging under the New Order. However, Indonesians appear to be of two minds: away from the border, they see foreigners threatening national resource sovereignty, but, on the border, they see interactions with familiar people, even kin, during a time of enhanced, though tenuous, local empowerment.

Notes

[1] We place ‘illegal’ within inverted commas because the central Indonesian government and international organisations regard much current timber harvesting as illegal, whereas local communities see the timber coming from their own traditionally managed forests as part of negotiated agreements with loggers (see Down to Earth (2004) for additional perspective on this issue).

[2] Wadley’s field research (1992–4) was funded by the National Science Foundation (Grant BNS-9114652), Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Sigma Xi, and Arizona State University, and was sponsored by the Balai Kajian Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan. Additional field research (2000) was funded by the International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, The Netherlands, and sponsored by the Center for International Forestry Research. Eilenberg’s field research (2002–3) was funded by a Maintenance Grant from the Government of Denmark, and was sponsored by the Program Strata-2 Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial, Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, Universitas Tanjungpura, Pontianak.

[3] Iban rely heavily on their forests for swidden rice farming and numerous non-timber forest products: one study determined that Iban, unaffected by timber cutting and related forest destruction, purchased only 9 per cent of their foods; the remainder came from fields and forest (Colfer et al. 2000).

[4] The DSNP conservation project during the mid-1990s was another aspect of this general trend toward increased outside claims on local resources (Colfer et al. 2001; Harwell 2000).


[6] Numerous local people say that communities and the bupati agreed to let Malaysian logging companies into the area because people were not able to make a living because of krismon. However, even outside logging, the economic crisis probably had a mixed impact on their livelihoods (Sunderlin et al. 2000).

In Indonesian, *cukong* refers to the entrepreneur with capital and *tauke* to the *cukong*’s agent who carries out the logging operation (McCarthy 2000, pp. 5–6). In the Iban areas, *tukei* are, by and large, the entrepreneurs.

The main tree species targeted for cutting are *meranti* (*Shorea* sp.), *ramin* (*Gonystylus* sp.), *kelansau* (*Dryobalanops oblongifolia*), *bedaru* (*Cantleya corniculata*) and *mabang* (*Shorea* sp.).

Occasional news reports of ‘illegal’ logging and smuggling of cut timber appear in the national and regional press, but efforts to stop it have tended to be very meagre (*Jakarta Post* 2000, 2003).

Once taken across the border, however, the lumber is exported beyond Malaysia, with potential profits to Malaysian lumber exporters averaging US$340 per cubic metre in 2000. At that time, community co-op commissions amounted to about 1 per cent of that potential profit.

As with the Sambas Malays, we make no claim to knowing how many of these non-locals there actually are, or have been, in the Iban borderland; recent ‘criminalisation’ of ‘illegal’ logging (see below) may have reduced their numbers.

The DSNP conservation project of the 1990s also gave impetus to some shifting territorial claims through its ambitious community mapping programme (Dennis 1997); elsewhere *otda* threatens to lead district governments into conflict over their own boundaries (*Bisnis Indonesia* 2001).

The Iban have proven themselves quite capable of taking matters into their own hands. For example, they effectively resisted military efforts in the 1960–70s to confiscate their shotguns used for hunting. And, in December 2000, a group of some 400 Iban men stormed a courthouse in Putussibau and killed a man who was on trial for murdering an Iban money-changer (*Pontianak Post* 2000b).

In addition to these local-level conflicts, rampant logging has threatened to lead into international disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia (Muhd 2003; *Equator Online* 2003; *Indonesian Observer* 2000; *Kompas* 2000b), and there have been co-operative Indonesian–Malaysian efforts elsewhere in the province to survey the border to show whether cutting by Malaysians was illegal (*Kompas* 2000a; *Pontianak Post* 2000a).

References


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